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SYMPOSIUM IN CELEBRATION OF
THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF
THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION:
LOCATING CULTURE, IDENTITY, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS
by Catherine Powell'
As we celebrate the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the idea of human rights endures. The human
rights idea was honored at a conference organized by the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, held at Fordham Law School on December
10-12, 1999, to commemorate the first fifty years of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. The four pieces that follow were presented at
the conference as part of a panel addressing one of the central philosophical
concerns regarding the human rights project: its universality. While the
panel's title, "What is a Human Right? Universals and the Challenge of
Cultural Relativism," provided the framework for discussion, all four papers
discard cultural relativism as a serious challenge, and instead attempt to
locate ways in which the human rights system either accommodates or fails
to respond to cultural difference.
In providing an overview to the four papers contained herein, this
Introduction investigates notions of culture and relativism by mapping the
geography of human rights. In contending that individuals everywhere,
regardless of location, are simultaneously bearers of rights and engaged with
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Human Rights Institute; B.A., Yale University (1987); M.P.A., Princeton University,
Woodrow Wilson School in International and Public Affairs (1991); J.D., Yale Law School
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culture, this overview locates culture and identity within the human rights
paradigm, rather than in opposition to it.' By positing that we are all holders
of rights and agents of culture, this overview also challenges the twin
assumptions that (1) nation-states which are geographically located in the
West are culturally neutral, and (2) Western states are therefore not
susceptible to relativist behavior.
I. THE BIRTH OF AN IDEA
Conceived of during World War II and in its aftermath, the
contemporary human rights idea insists that all humans everywhere are
inherently entitled to basic rights simply by virtue of our humanity. Human
rights assert that every human being is entitled to have basic autonomy and
freedom respected and basic needs satisfied.2 A parsing of the human rights
idea reveals its organizing principle: the geography of rights corresponds to
human beings, not territorial location, status, or culture.
Human rights are conceived of as "human" because they are implied
in our humanity; human rights are inalienable. These rights cannot be
transferred, waived, forfeited, usurped, or lost through failure to exercise or
assert them. Humans are entitled to these rights equally and in equal
measure, regardless of location. Human rights are also conceptualized as
"rights," not mere aspirations or charity. The idea of rights asserts an
entitlement on the part of the rights bearer under an applicable norm, and an
obligation on the part of society to incorporate that entitlement into its
system of values and laws.'
According to this idea, individuals have claims ("rights") upon
society and society has corresponding duties to provide domestic laws and
institutions to effectuate these rights.' The duties which nation-states owe are
I. Humans, both individually and collectively, create, reflect, and are shaped by
culture, and the human rights framework contains safeguards protecting culture, including
indicia of culture, such as religion and language. See, e.g.,Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, art. 27, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc A/810, at 71 (1948)
[hereinafter Universal Declaration]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
art. 27, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter
ICCPR].
2. Louis Henkin, The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights 1 (1981).
3. Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights 2-3 (1990).
4. Henkin, supra note 2, at 1.
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both negative and affirmative, as they must respect, protect, and ensure
rights. While respecting rights can be achieved through government restraint
from violating rights, protecting and ensuring rights requires more: states
must affirmatively provide mechanisms to prevent and punish rights
violators, as well as to effectuate rights.5
While these dimensions of the human rights idea are now widely
understood and agreed upon, in this Introduction I examine three commonly
held assumptions that undermine the force of the rights idea. The first
assumption is that the idea of human rights is an exclusively Western
concept. The second and related assumption is that "cultural" objections to
human rights are an exclusively nonWestern phenomenon. Finally, I
challenge the apparent assumption that the only relativism which threatens
universality is cultural relativism, in contrast to other relativisms that are
reflected in the selective enforcement and invocation of human rights in and
by Western and nonWestern states alike.
Taken collectively, these assumptions construct Western states as
good actors and nonWestern states as bad actors vis i vis human rights
compliance, even while this construction does not necessarily square with
the reality on the ground." This state of affairs increases resentment in
nonWestern states toward Western states, undercutting universal acceptance
of the rights idea as it is more difficult for nonWestern states to be co-owners
of and co-equals in the human rights project. For decades, scholars have
discredited the construction of nonWestern countries as the culturally
primitive "other," which allowed the West to define a contrasting identity as
rational and civilized-a device used in the service of colonialism and
5. While the distinction between civil and political rights on the one hand and
economic, social, and cultural rights on the other is often understood as a rearticulation of
the negative/affirmative rights dichotomy, several theorists have critiqued this dichotomy.
See e.g, Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy 35-40
(1980). After all, effectuating welfare rights (typically considered an affirmative or economic
right) requires no greater affirmative government outlays than the right to liberty (typically
considered a negative or civil right), which requires supporting the cost of a police force,
judicial system, and the right to counsel for indigent defendants.
6. The very terms "Western" and "nonWestern" in human rights theory reflect and
reinscribe the default assumption that the West is culturally neutral, while the nonWestem
(the not Western) is a residual category and powerful signifier that captures the "other" (the
not culturally neutral). I use the terms "Western" and "nonWestern" in this Introduction both
to examine and deconstruct the set of assumptions that underlies this dichotomy.
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imperialism.7 Today's selective invocation of "culture" and relativism to
describe human rights noncompliance by nonWestern countries, while
noncompliance by Western countries is rationalized, recreates a West/Rest
dichotomy that is preoccupied by an assumed default Western conception of
human rights. Ironically, nonWestern governments play along with these
assumptions, shielding their noncompliance behind charges that human
rights is a form of cultural imperialism and enabling Western governments
to mask their noncompliance as rational
In fact, early ideas about human rights did not originate exclusively
in the West nor were they exclusively identified with any particular form of
government, such as liberal democracy." While the modern idea of human
rights draws inspiration from John Locke and from revolutionary moments
in the American and French experience,' ° these eighteenth-century ideas
about individual autonomy were eventually combined with nineteenth- and
7. See Edward W. Said, Orientalism 3 (1978) (explaining how the creation of "the
Orient" in European and American literature, discourse, and imagination has supported
Western global conquest and domination); Gayatri C. Spivak, In Other Worlds: Essays in
Cultural Politics (1988) (exploring how changes in power alignments are signaled by
changes in sign-systems); Leti Volpp, Talking "Culture": Gender, Race, Nation, and the
Politics ofMulticulturalism, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1573, 1602 n.140 (1996) ("Imperialism has
been justified by ideology which posits a fundamental distinction between the West and the
rest of the world, created through perceived geographical and cultural barriers, as well as by
methods used to codify difference among peoples, which chart progress 'from primitive to
subject races,' and finally to 'superior or civilized peoples,"' (referring to Edward W. Said,
Culture and Imperialism 108-9 (1993))).
8. While noncompliance by Western states is seen as rational rather than cultural,
adherence to human rights is assumed to be inherent in Western "culture," thereby creating
the West as a culturally neutral baseline from which any deviation is relativistic. This
assumption is misguided. See Amartya Sen, Human Rights and Asian Values, The New
Republic, July 14 & 21, 1997, at 34 (contesting the "tendency in America and Europe to
assume, if only implicitly, the primacy of political freedom and democracy as a fundamental
and ancient feature of Western culture").
9. Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of Human Rights: Visions Seen 9-11 (1998)
(discussing philosophical traditions in diverse cultures that are consistent with the human
rights idea, ranging from Chinese Confucianist-inspired philosophy to Buddhist, Islamic,
Hindu, and traditional African societies); see also Sen, supra note 8, at 33 ("Our ideas of
political and personal rights have taken their particular form relatively recently, and it is hard
to see them as 'traditional' commitments of Western cultures.... [A]ntecedents can be
found plentifully in Asian cultures as well as Western cultures." Id. at 40.).
10. For example, the Universal Declaration borrows language and concepts from the
American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and
of the Citizen. See Henkin, supra note 3, at 1.
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twentieth-century ideas about socialism, the welfare state, decolonization,
and the proliferation of modem constitutions and bills of rights." This broad
conception of the human rights idea found full expression in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Adopted in 1948, the Universal Declaration
has been accepted by virtually all of today's states.
While Western and nonWestern governments alike have embraced
the Universal Declaration, both have also failed to respect, implement, and
enforce the full range of human rights guaranteed in the International Bill of
Rights. As such, although we live in an "Age of Rights"'2 and in an era of
spreading democratization and constitutionalism, international scrutiny
continues to be necessary where states have failed to guarantee rights. This
failure is enabled through selective enforcement, treaty reservations, and the
existence of two separate covenants that divide civil and political rights from
economic, social, and cultural rights. While the failure of nonWestern states
to respect human rights is often characterized as being grounded in
"cultural" and relativistic objections, by contrast, similar failures of Western
states to respect human rights are often described as being based on
constitutional, religious, or free market objections. 3 The four articles
contained herein do not take on this dilemma directly, perhaps because the
11. Henkin, supra note 2, at 12. Indeed, the right to self-determination, which appears
as Article 1 in both of the International Covenants, reflects the concerns and experience of
decolonizing states, which have been primarily nonWestern. See ICCPR, supra note 1, art.
1; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 1, G.A. Res. 2200A,
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6
I.L.M. 360 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
12. As coined by Prof. Louis Henkin in his pioneering book The Age of Rights, supra
note 3 (stating that human rights is the idea of our time).
13. This dichotomy is apparent in the ways in which governments themselves assert
treaty reservations, in scholarship on human rights and culture, and in much of the popular
discourse about rights and culture. See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Where Does the U.S. Stand on
Women's Human Rights? Reflections in a Jaundiced Eye (comparing reservations,
understandings, and declarations made by the United States and Islamic countries) (on file
with author). For an excellent discussion of how nonWestern cultures are often described
as barriers to human rights, while Western societies are seen as neutral and therefore lacking
cultural barriers to human rights, see Leti Volpp, Multiculturalism v. Feminism, paper
presented at Yale Law School, James Thomas Lecture (on file with author) (discussing, for
example, how dowry murders in India are "used as a signifier of cultural backwardness,"
while domestic violence murders in the United States are not; although both phenomena
reflect forms of violence against women--"they burn their women there [in India] we shoot
our women here [in the United States]"--only Third-World women are described as
suffering "death by culture.").
1999] 205
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selectivity of human rights enforcement in and by Western countries is
frequently masked as rational and therefore does not appear to disrupt the
principle of universality. This dilemma is a core concern that this
Introduction seeks to address.
11. HUMAN RIGHTS: A UNIVERSAL AND INTERNATIONAL IDEA
The contemporary human rights idea has become both universal and
international, as an empirical matter. The idea of human rights is universal,
insofar as it is accepted by practically all states, despite political, economic,
and cultural variation. 4 In piercing national sovereignty, human rights
scrutiny has transformed governments' treatment of individuals into an
appropriate subject of international inquiry. The collapse of the Cold War
creates conditions for these trends to continue. However, some
governments-both Western and nonWestem--use various strategies to try
to limit their human rights accountability: raising claims of "sovereignty" to
frustrate external monitoring; hiding behind various banners of" relativism"
to undermine the idea of universality; and invoking the "free market" as a
way to subordinate human rights and democracy to desired economic growth
or economic development achieved through political repression.'5
Take, for example, the U.S. response during the April 1999 session
of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights to Radhika Coomaraswamy, the
U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, who issued a report
documenting sexual abuse of women prisoners by prison guards in the
United States and the lack of effective remedies to address this abuse.'6 U.S.
officials responded by saying that this is a domestic issue that was more
appropriately directed to the Justice Department, rather than to an
international forum where the United States had more "important" work to
14. "The universalization of human rights is a political fact.... [E]ven those, notably
the European Communist states, which had abstained when the Declaration was approved,
have now accepted it formally in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation (Helsinki, 1975)." Henkin, supra note 2, at I.
15. Henkin, supra note 3, at xi.
16. Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and
consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, in accordance with Commission on Human
Rights resolution 1997/44, Addendum, Report of the mission to the United States of
America on the issue of violence against women in state and federal prisons, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1 999/68/Add.2 (1999).
206 [30:201
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do, such as focus on China and other "real" human rights abusers.' 7
Additionally, the U.S. position is that it is constrained by federalism with
regard to that part of the report concerning state prisons.' Bowing to the
"sovereignty" of the states that comprise the nation, the United States
frequently invokes federalism as a device to shield its record from
international scrutiny. Of course, federalism does not prevent the United
States from providing federal civil rights remedies to state prisoners. Nor can
the United States take the position that its prisons are any less subject to
international standards than are prisons in China, without doing serious
damage to the principle of universality.
While human rights conditions and compliance vary widely, no
government dissents from the ideology of human rights or offers an
alternative to it. Even those Asian countries that issued the "Bangkok
Declaration" in 1993 acknowledged "the universality, objectivity and non-
selectivity of all human rights." 9 Issued at a regional meeting in preparation
for the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, the Bangkok
Declaration instead contends that the focus on civil and political rights
unfairly spotlights "one category of rights," while ignoring other rights, such
as the right to development. The Bangkok Declaration posits that this focus
fails to respect "the interdependence and indivisibility of economic, social,
cultural, civil, and political rights, and the need to give equal emphasis to all
categories of human rights."2 At the Vienna World Conference, the head of
the Chinese delegation reiterated this objection: 2'
Different historical development stages have different human
rights requirements.... For the vast number of developing
countries, to respect and protect human rights is first and
foremost to ensure the full realization of the rights to subsistence
and development. ... To wantonly accuse another country of
abuse of human rights and impose the human rights criteria of
one's own country or region on other countries or regions are
17. Telephone interview with Widney Brown, Human Rights Watch (June 8, 1999).
18. Id.
19. Report of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human
Rights, Bangkok, 29 March-2 April 1993, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/ASRM/8 (1993).
20. Id.
21. Speech by Liu Huaqiu, World Human Rights Conference in Vienna (June 1993),
quoted in Michael C. Davis, Human Rights in Asia: China and the Bangkok Declaration,
2 Buff. Int'l L. 215, 226-27 (1996).
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tantamount to an infringement upon the sovereignty of other
countries and interference in the latter's internal affairs....
Underlying this statement was the contention that economic
development could only be achieved through authoritarian forms of
government and that authoritarianism is inherent in "Asian values." The
claim that civil and political rights reflect "Western values" that are
inconsistent with "Asian values" triggered a strong response from Asian
non-governmental organizations and intellectuals who criticized the idea that
all Asians share a certain monolithic set of values that are distinct from the
West. Contending that "there are no quintessential values that separate the
Asians as a group from people in the rest of the world," Amartya Sen, for
example, asks rhetorically, "What can we take to be the values of so vast a
region, with so much diversity?"' Sen notes that "the so-called Asian values
that are invoked to justify authoritarianism are not especially Asian in any
significant sense."23 Critiquing the thesis that Western and Asian values
present a "clash of civilizations,"24 Sen suggests that the more relevant clash
is one of individual citizens asserting their rights and governments
attempting to repress these rights. The West, then, is a convenient foil used
to divert attention from the fact that it is individual citizens demanding their
human rights. Regardless of whether the demand for human rights
accountability comes from an internal or external source, "[t]he people
whose rights are being disputed are Asians, and, no matter what the West's
guilt may be... the rights of Asians can scarcely be compromised on those
grounds."25 Sen's refraining of the Asian values debate provides a useful
backdrop for consideration of the ways in which the four articles in this
collection attempt to locate (or dislocate) notions of cultural difference and
identity within (or from) the human rights framework.
22. Sen, supra note 8, at 34 (suggesting also that the "temptation to see Asia as a
single unit" and as reflecting a monolithic set of Asian values reflects alternatively naivete,
a "Euro-centric perspective," and disingenuous tendencies to subvert human rights
compliance).
23. Id. at 40; see also W. Theodore de Bary, Asian Values and Human Rights: A
Confucian Communitarian Perspective (1998) (demonstrating that Confucian
Communitarianism has historically resisted state domination).
24. Sen, supra note 8, at 40 (referring to the phrase coined by Samuel P. Huntington
in Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996), which describes the new
world order as one of a "clash of civilizations" between Western and nonWestem values).
25. Id. at 40.
[30:201
SYMPOSIUM INTRODUCTION
III. LOCATING CULTURAL DIFFERENCE WITHIN
THE HUMAN RIGHTS PARADIGM
In his article How to Argue for a Universal Claim, Jeremy Waldron
contends that certain forms of resistance, including Islamic objections, to
universal human rights norms must be seen as presenting competing notions
concerning the content of rights, rather than seen as forms of resistance to
universality per se.26 I agree with Waldron's basic premise. The insight
behind this premise teaches us that resistance to human rights norms is not
necessarily relativist, as such resistance may itself reflect an alternative
universalist tendency (informed by claims that may be at odds with those
embodied in the human rights idea). While I agree with this insight, I will
seek to complicate the direction Waldron's premise takes.
In offering the example of Iranian clerical objections to free speech
principles that support pornography on the Internet, Waldron illustrates
opposition between two values (i.e., free speech and religious freedom)."
According to Waldron, such an opposition positions "Western" human rights
principles of free speech against Muslim religious beliefs.' However, I am
less troubled than Waldron in that I do not view the competing claims that
arise in this example (and others he discusses) as necessarily positioning the
West against the Muslim world (or other societies). Such a clash of
civilizations is not evident in that diversity and overlap exists within and
between these spheres. 9 The fact that Iranian clerics may oppose free speech
26. Jeremy Waldron, How to Argue for a Universal Claim, infra at 305, 311-312.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 312 (referring to "our standards" in the West in contrast to "the Muslim
response to our toleration of pornography").
29. Lama Abu-Odeh, Post-Colonial Feminism and the Veil Considering the
Differences, 26 New Eng. L. Rev. 1527 (1992) (discussing multiple and complex identities
of Arab Muslim women as regards the veil); see also Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture:
Asian Women and the "Cultural Defense," 17 Harv. Women's L.J. 57 (1994) (discussing
tendency of U.S. courts to treat American identity and culture as a neutral backdrop, on the
one hand, and Asian communities as static, monolithic, and misogenystic, on the other, as
masking diversity within Asian communities).
Of course, the idea that the West and the Muslim world are two completely
separate spheres must itself be further complicated by the fact that-with transnational flows
of culture, capital, and labor-the parameters of the West and the Islamic world are often
intermingled. Cf Inderpal Grewal & Caren Kaplan, Introduction to Scattered Hegemonies:
Postmodemity and Transnational Feminist Practices 10-13 (Inderpal Grewal & Caren
Kaplan eds., 1994).
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principles justifying a pornography site (or, for that matter, a democracy site)
on the Internet does not mean that these religious elites speak for or
represent all of Iranian "culture" or Muslim "culture."30 Culture is not
monolithic, fixed, or static.3 Indeed, culture is a social construct which is
constantly contested and redefined through dynamic processes that occur
within and between various cultures. 2 So while government or religious
elites may object on cultural grounds to human rights norms as "Western,"
individual citizens within these cultures are oftentimes the voices asserting
30. Cf. Azizah al-Hibri, Islam, Law and Custom: Redefining Muslim Women's Rights,
12 Am. U. J. Int'l L. & Policy 1 (1997) (discussing diversity of views, even among devout
Muslims, on questions concerning human rights issues, such as women's rights; the author's
own Muslim feminist perspective is based on her reading of the Koran, which supports
women's equality in many ways, while jurisprudence-which is primarily created through
interpretation of Islamic law by male clerical elites-is often patriarchical); see also Sen,
supra note 8, at 34 (constructions of "culture" by government elites do not necessarily
represent the "vast variations of cultural and historical traditions, despite the fact that the
conformism that characterizes [the] political leadership and the official interpretation of
Asian values is very powerful").
31. See generally James Clifford, The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century
Ethnography, Literature, and Art (1988) (examining fluidity and hybridity of culture);
George E. Marcus & Michael M.J. Fischer, Anthropology as Cultural Critique: An
Experimental Moment in the Human Sciences (1986) (same); Renato Rosaldo, Culture &
Truth: The Remaking of Social Analysis (1989) (same); Writing Culture: The Poetics and
Politics of Ethnography (James Clifford & George E. Marcus, eds., 1986) (same); Volpp,
supra note 7, at 1589 (same).
32. See Rosaldo, supra note 31; Clifford, The Predicament of Culture, supra note 31;
Uma Narayan, Dislocating Cultures: Identities, Traditions, and Third-World Feminism 20-21
(1997). To the extent that a hegemonic culture exists in a particular society, this "hegemony
consists of '1. the spontaneous consent given by the great masses of the population [and] 2.
the apparatus of state coercive power which legally enforces discipline on those groups who
do not consent either actively or passively."' KimberI6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform,
and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv.
L. Rev. 1331, 1360 (1988) (quoting Antonio Gramsci, Selections From the Prison
Notebooks (Q. Hoare & G. Smith trans., 1971)).
210 [30:201
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these very norms.3 3 The "Muslim response" to human rights must therefore
be deconstructed, as there is unlikely to be a monolithic response.34
Waldron implicitly recognizes that the reverse is true: that in the
West there is no monolithic response to questions of free speech and
pornography. He notes that some members of the religious right and feminist
movements oppose pornography, while others in both camps defend it on the
grounds of freedom of speech. In fact, both Christian and feminist objections
against pornography in the West may be characterized as being cultural in
the same way Islamic objections in nonWestern societies are characterized."
Again, such objections do not necessarily represent the culture of the entire
society, even if they are made by religious or political leaders within the
society.' Competing universalist claims, then, may be just as likely to arise
33. See Hope Lewis and Isabelle Gunning, Essay: Cleaning Our Own House:
"Exotic" and Familial Human Rights Violations, 4 Buff. H.Rts. L. R. 123,127, n.12 (1998)
(discussing indigenous African women's organizations that are working to oppose female
genital cutting-another practice Waldron implies is only opposed by Westerners based on
"our Western views about women and sexuality." Waldron, at 310 (emphasis in original)).
34. See al-Hibri, supra note 30; Douglas Jehl, Arab Honors Price: A Woman's Blood,
N.Y. Times, June 20, 1999, at AI (citing disagreement within Muslim societies between
those who contend Islam permits family members to kill girls and women suspected of
infidelity, premarital sex, or other allegations of sexual conduct believed to shame the
family, and those who contend that such killings have no basis in the Koran and violate the
human rights of women). Consider also the use of human rights discourse by Muslims going
back to as early as 1990 in response to human rights violations carried out by Serbs against
Muslims in Kosovo. See, e.g., Albanians in Yugoslavia Strike Over Human Rights, L.A.
Times, Sept. 4, 1990, at A 18 ("Tens of thousands of ethnic Albanians staged a one-day
general strike in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo on Monday to protest against human
rights violations by the republic of Serbia.").
35. See Narayan, supra note 32, at 34-35 (in discussing how discourse around
"Christian values" and "family values" have become constitutive of "American culture,"
Narayan notes, "[A]s the visible presence of many Christian groups on the right wing of the
American political spectrum makes amply clear, religious fundamentalist politics are not a
phenomenon unique to Third-World contexts."). While "culture" is often defined as being
organized around race, ethnicity, and religion, cultural feminists believe that "women are
shaped by their culture in certain ways" that make women different from men. Linda J.
Lacey, Mimicking the Words, But Missing the Message: The Misuse of Cultural Feminist
Themes in Religion and Family Law Jurisprudence, 35 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 3, n.21 (1993).
Cultural feminists have also, in turn, influenced American culture. For example, Carol
Gilligan's book, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development
(1982) probably laid the groundwork for later trends in popular culture, such as "girl power."
36. This is particularly true where leaders are not democratically elected. In a
democratic society, particular policy positions could be seen as more directly reflecting
"culture." However, even in a democracy, elected leaders do not necessarily represent the
1999]
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in the context of an intra-communal debate (i.e., within a particular society)
as in an inter-communal debate (i.e., between two societies)." This is
particularly true when opposition to a universalist claim (i.e., free speech
principles justifying pornography on the Internet) is deployed as a pretext for
suppression of other rights (i.e., political dissent of government policies).38
Waldron's positioning of free speech and religious freedom as two
competing universalist claims raises a second and related concern, which is
addressed by other articles in this volume: how can the human rights idea be
universal if it fails to take into account religious objections? Waldron
contends that certain critics of the "human rights orthodoxy" may believe
that their objections "cannot be understood except from a religious
perspective, and that human rights theories have impoverished themselves
by ruling out such perspectives a priori."'39 However, the human rights
framework does not rule out religious perspectives apriori. Article 18 of the
Universal Declaration states, "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion." Indeed, religious freedom is a universal norm,
and the fact that different people embrace different religious traditions does
not make the right to religious freedom any less universal.4' From a human
rights standpoint, religious freedom and free speech are both universal
rights, a fact that does not necessarily make the challenge of sorting out
competing demands easier. The real issue is what does religious freedom
demand, require, and permit?
full spectrum of cultural values of the electorate, as voters may elect a leader for reasons
other than their stand on a particular "cultural" issue (i.e., pornography on the Internet).
37. See Michel Rosenfeld, Can Human Rights Bridge the Gap Between Universalism
and Cultural Relativism? A Pluralist Assessment Based on the Rights of Minorities, infra
at 249, 272, n.59 (discussing distinction between intra-communal and inter-communal
relations). Accord Jeremy Waldron, What is Cosmopolitan?, J. Pol. Phil. (forthcoming,
1999) (describing complex relationships that are created by the fact that humans must live
with each other side by side).
38. See, e.g., Eric Goldstein, Cyber-Censorship (and Evasion) in the Middle East,
Middle East Insight, Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 53 ("[G]ovemments paternalistically invoke affronts
to conservative Muslim sensibilities-notably pornography-when justifying their restrictive
or go-slow approaches to the Internet. Almost without exception, their restrictions also target
political or human rights criticism.").
39. Waldron, supra note 26, at 312.
40. See Universal Declaration, supra note I, art. 18; see also ICCPR, supra note 1,
arts. 18 & 27.
41. Rosenfeld, supra note 37, at 252.
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Tracy Higgins' article in this collection drives this point home.4" In
a discussion of the ways in which religious and cultural practices are
justified through the invocation of human rights protections concerning
religious freedom, cultural integrity, and autonomy, Higgins notes that these
challenges are difficult precisely because "the defenders of such cultural
practices tend to invoke justifications human rights advocates are obliged to
respect."' 3 Higgins suggests that while these conflicts of rights are difficult
to balance, at least such competing claims are within the same rights based
paradigm." "Although certain groups will continue to stand outside the
existing framework and challenge its terms, it is acceptance of the language
of rights, not recognition of cultural difference that is the relevant marker."'4
In a similar vein, Higgins points out that feminist critiques of human
rights are also internal to our "human rights framework."'46 For example,
feminists have criticized human rights as being defined largely in male
terms, and centered in notions of liberal or formal equality. Feminists have
furthered challenged the traditional focus on negative rights against the state
as understating the need for state intervention to limit abuses of private
power, such as domestic violence.47 While these arguments have radical
potential in that they mark the limits of the human rights paradigm, they also
42. See Tracy Higgins, Regarding Rights: An Essay Honoring the Fiftieth Anniversary
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, infra at 225.
43. Id. at 245 (citing polygamy, female genital cutting, and strict rules of purdah as
examples). For a proposed balancing test designed to negotiate women's rights and religious
freedom when such rights conflict, see Donna Sullivan, Gender Equality and Religious
Freedom: Toward a Framework for Conflict Resolution, 24 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Policy 795
(1992).
44. Higgins, supra note 42, at 246-7; see also id. at 244-5 (discussion of conflict of
rights in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), in which the Court barred an
Indian Civil Rights Act suit, where a woman challenged the double standard whereby if a
mother was a member of the tribe, but the father was not, their children would be excluded
from membership, whereas the children of a male member of the tribe could obtain tribal
membership, despite the mother's membership status).
45. Id. at 248.
46. Id. at 241.
47. See, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright, Feminist
Approaches to International Law, 85 Am. J. Int'l L. 613 (1991); Celina Romany, Women
as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public Private Distinction in International Human
Rights Law, 6 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 87 (1993).
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seek to recast rights to more fully address women's needs.4 g Higgins notes
that "[t]he response to this critique, therefore, involves an expansion of our
notion of personhood to embrace more fully the experiences of women,
particularly with respect to the impact of private power and violence."49 In
fact, the Universal Declaration appears to envision protections beyond the
actions of states,' and, as alluded to earlier, the human rights idea requires
states to affirmatively provide mechanisms to prevent and punish rights
violators, even when these violations occur in the private sphere.5 Because
feminist critiques can be read as challenges that are internal to the human
rights paradigm, Higgins contends that these critiques should not be seen as
threats to the human rights idea, but rather as "opportunities to see it in a
new light."'5 Therefore, identity-based critiques of human rights, whether
based on religion, culture, or feminism, do not ultimately undermine the
concept of universality when such critiques are made within the context of
rights discourse.53
A further insight Higgins offers is that associational interests do not
necessarily stand outside the framework of human rights. While the human
rights paradigm is based on liberal conceptions emphasizing individual
autonomy, rights also "imply a respect that places one in the referential range
of self and others, that elevate one's status from human body to social
being." Indeed, the Universal Declaration includes certain rights, such as
linguistic or cultural rights, which can be exercised meaningfully only in a
group, and still other rights, nominally understood as individual, which
48. Higgins supra note 42, at 241; see also Crenshaw, supra note 32, at 1386
(positing an alternative vision to that offered by Critical Legal Studies, Crenshaw states that
the challenge for a subordinated group in using rights rhetoric is in creating "a counter-
hegemony by maneuvering within and expanding the dominant ideology to embrace the
potential for change.").
49. Higgins, supra note 42, at 242.
50. Id. at 242-3 (discussing application of the Universal Declaration to private
employers and other non-state actors).
51. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 2(3) ("Each State Party to the present
Covenant undertakes: (a) To ensure that any person whose rights ... are violated shall have
an effective remedy"); Velasquez Rodriguez, 28 I.L.M. 291, 324-26 (1989) (finding that
Honduras had an obligation to prevent, investigate, and punish violations, even where it was
not clear that the violators were state actors).
52. Higgins, supra note 42, at 242.
53. Id. at 240-3.
54. Patricia J. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights 153 (1991) (cited by
Higgins, supra note 42, at 229-30).
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contemplate collective exercise, such as freedom of the press and association
and the right to jury trial."5 However, Hurst Hannum contends that
recognition of group rights has actually been quite limited, until recently.56
As an example of this limitation, Hannum cites Article 27 of the ICCPR,
which provides that "persons belonging to [ethnic, religious, and linguistic
minorities] shall not be denied the right, in community with the other
members of the group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice
their own religion, or use their own language." Hannum notes, "This
minimalist and individually oriented text (note that 'persons belonging to'
protected minorities are the possessors of rights) reflected the prevalent view
of the 1950s and 1960s that issues of ethnicity, religion, and language would
gradually diminish in importance as marginal or less developed population
groups were integrated or assimilated into a democratic, non-discriminatory
society."57 Until recent instruments concerning the rights of indigenous
people and minorities were adopted, "the only widely accepted group right
was the right of self-determination, but self-determination in the era of
decolonization was based primarily on territory, not human beings."58
In his article in this collection, Michel Rosenfeld examines the
controversy over competing rights, particularly as such conflicts emerge
between individual and group rights.59 Rosenfeld notes that this conflict
typically arises when, for example, an individual woman asserts her right to
gender equality in the context of a minority community that asserts a
competing right which may be characterized as a group right (i.e.,
concerning cultural and religious affiliation).' The conflict is particularly
acute where the community perceives assertion of these group rights as vital
to the community's survival, whereas the individual's right to gender
55. See Ethnicity and Group Rights 4 (Ian Shapiro & Will Kymlicka, eds., 1997);
Thomas Franck, Legal Culture and Culture Culture, lecture to be published in the
proceedings of the 93rd Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (July
26, 1999) (discussing group rights dimensions of freedom of association).
56. Hurst Hannum, Minorities, Indigenous Peoples, and Self-Determination, in
Human Rights: An Agenda for the Next Century 1 (Louis Henkin & John Lawrence
Hargrove, eds., 1994).
57. Id. at5.
58. Id. at6.
59. Rosenfeld, supra note 37, at 268-70.
60. Id. at 264-5, citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978)
(unsuccessful sex equality challenge to tribe's prerogative to define tribal membership in
discriminatory way).
1999]
COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LA W REVIEW
equality is seen as undermining community survival or "polluting" the
community with external values.6'
Rosenfeld offers "comprehensive pluralism" as a vehicle through
which individual and group rights can be mediated and weighed. "[W]hile
the comparisons in question may not be that precise and while they may not
furnish a clear cut result in every case, they are nonetheless quite comparable
to many of the kinds of analyses that are routinely used in constitutional
adjudication." Indeed, the Universal Declaration seems to have envisioned
such mediation between individual and group rights, as the rights therein
range from those conceived as individual to those which are more
associational by definition.
Analysis of the conflicts that emerge when cultural objections are
asserted vis i vis individual rights often center on minority communities or
nonWestern societies. However, Western and nonWestem states alike object
to individual rights through reservations, understandings, and declarations
to treaties. The United States, for example, having signed (but not yet
ratified) the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW), has proposed certain reservations. One such
reservation states that "the United States does not accept any obligation
under this Convention to enact legislation establishing the doctrine of
comparable worth as that term is understood in U.S. practice."''3 Because the
doctrine of comparable worth would require changes in occupational
structures and recalibration of the value of "women's work," this doctrine is
perceived as a threat to market-based theories of supply and demand.
However, given that other exceptions are made to pure market-oriented
approaches (i.e., agricultural subsidies), the United States' proposed
61. Of course, such competing claims are not necessarily limited to questions
concerning women's equality. See, e.g., Rosenfeld, supra note 37, at 263-4 (discussing
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), in which Amish parents successfully sought an
exemption from the state's compulsory education requirement for children over the age of
fourteen. Rosenfeld, supra note 37, at 263. In agreeing that an exemption was
constitutionally warranted so that the Amish parents could socialize their children consistent
with their religious values, Justice Stewart, in a concurrence, expressed concern that there
was no inquiry into whether the individual adolescent to be taken out of school agrees with
his or her parent's decision to do so. Id., citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 237 (Stewart, J.,
concurring)).
62. Id. at 275-6 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973)).
63. 140 Cong. Rec. S13927-04 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1994) (report (No. 103-38) by Mr.
Pell, from the Committee on Foreign Relations).
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reservation to CEDAW's protections requiring equal remuneration is an
example of relativism, and perhaps even cultural relativism.'
On the whole, the international community has negotiated
universality and cultural difference through reservations to treaties.
Reservations have served as an escape hatch for Western and nonWestern
countries alike. Consistent with what I have argued earlier regarding
constructions of culture by political leaders, it is worth noting here that when
a cultural objection forms the basis of a treaty reservation, it is a construction
of culture invoked by a government-a notion of culture that may or may not
be shared by citizens in the society. As exceptions to the application of
human rights norms, reservations undermine the idea of universality, even
while they preserve the ability of states to, at least superficially, gain
respectibility as human rights oberservers.65
Reservations and treaty noncompliance affect three groups in
particular: women, religious groups, and minorities. Among U.N. human
rights treaties, CEDAW "has attracted the greatest number of reservations
with the potential to modify or exclude most, if not all, of the terms of the
treaty." ' Moreover, one need only consider the genocide and other human
rights abuses that have occurred in the Balkans and Rwanda to appreciate the
fact that large scale human rights violations continue to be organized around
religious and/or ethnic difference. Furthermore, reservations submitted by
the United States cabin its treaty obligations by defining international
obligations to be no greater than what U.S. law already provides, with
profound implications for civil rights enforcement. The movement should be
to discourage and reverse the trend in making such reservations. Pressure
should be asserted in the opposite direction.
64. C.f. Deborah L. Rhode, Justice and Gender 309 (1989) (beyond celebrating values
traditionally associated with women, relational cultural feminism "has insisted that these
values be valued and has demanded changes in occupational structures, public policies, and
male attitudes.").
65. Of course, states may object to a reservation of another state. Also, reservations
"incompatible with the object and purpose" of the Covenant are impermissible. Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 19, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340.
66. Belinda Clerk, The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention
on Discrimination Against Women, 85 Am. Int'l L. 281, 317 (1991).
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IV. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW:
AFFIRMING THE HUMANITY OF ALL,
REGARDLESS OF IDENTITY OR LOCATION
As the close of the twentieth century draws near, we reflect on an
era of two world wars; genocide and gross human rights abuses in conflict
situations; military dictatorships and apartheid. Increasingly, conflicts occur
within nation-states, rather than between them. These internal conflicts are
frequently organized around religious and ethnic difference, with individuals
targeted because of their identity (i.e., because of their membership in
particular religious, ethnic, racial, linguistic, or indigenous groups). Human
rights treaties embody nondiscrimination principles that largely reject
consideration of such distinctions.67 At the same time, international criminal
justice prosecutions are organized around difference insofar as the definition
of certain crimes, such as genocide, recognizes persecution based on group
identity." In her article in this collection, Ruti Teitel critiques this approach,
charging that it reaffirms difference.6 Teitel asks to what extent international
criminal justice prosecutions "simply represent past wrongdoing; or to what
extent is it intended to be transformative of that past wrongdoing?"7 On the
one hand, Teitel expresses concern about the "risk" of reaffirming "identity
politics" by representing wrongdoing through the prosecution of crimes
defined by the identity of the individuals they target.7 On the other hand,
67. See, e.g., Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art. 2 ("Everyone is entitled to all
the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind...").
But see ICCPR, supra note I, art. 27 (recognizing that persons belonging to religious,
linguistic and ethnic minorities have a right to enjoy their culture in community with other
members of their group.); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, art. 1(4), Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (recognizing that temporary
affirmative action measures shall not be deemed discriminatory); Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, art. 4, Mar. 1, 1980, G.A. Res.
34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46 at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1980), 1249
U.N.T.S. 13 (same).
68. Genocide includes certain "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group." Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. II, Jan. 12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1951).
69. Ruti Teitel, The Universal and the Particular in International Criminal Justice,
infra at 285.
70. Id. at 298.
71. Id. at 299-302; see also id. at 298 ("In this regard, contemporary human rights
proceedings risk emphasizing ethno-conscious elements of persecution that, to some extent,
would affirm, and perhaps even in some small way reenact, past persecution.").
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Teitel recognizes the value of identity-based approaches by noting that
provisions of the International Criminal Court statute which allow
prosecution of rape as a war crime, crime against humanity, and potentially
as an act of genocide reaffirm "that women are part of 'humanity.'" 72 Indeed,
preserving collective memory and compensating victims-both goals which
war crimes prosecutions seek to address 3--necessarily involves affirming
that members of the specific targeted groups (i.e., women, Jews, Tutsis,
Kosovar Muslims) are part of humanity. Reaffirming humanity (i.e., that we
are all members of the human race), in this sense, necessarily involves
affirmation, respect, and tolerance of religious, cultural, linguistic, and other
differences.
Perhaps a more troubling contradiction in this era of internal conflict
is the redlining of rights that has been revealed in comparing the United
States' foreign policy response to human rights abuses in Kosovo in 1999 to
its response to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994."' It would be overly
simplistic to contend that the differential response is based solely on race,
and I do not use the term "redlining" in this sense. The differential response
is more complicated than can be explained by noting that the United States
chose to respond to one crisis and not the other because Kosovo is in a
predominantly white neighborhood (i.e., Europe) and Rwanda is in a
predominantly black one (i.e., Africa). The failure to respond to the crisis in
Rwanda can in part be explained by American paralysis following graphic
television images of the corpse of an American soldier dragged through the
streets of Somalia following intervention there. Rwanda also suffered from
broader paralysis by the international community and by the United Nations,
following its failed mission in Somalia.75 In 1994, neither the United States
72. Id. at 16.
73. Jose Alvarez, Crimes of State/Crimes of Hate (forthcoming 1999) (arguing that
international prosecutions have not achieved stated goals effectively).
74. My comments here have benefitted from conversations with Kendall Thomas, who
is involved in more sustained research in this area. Besides Rwanda, the international
community has also failed to intervene in any meaningful way in conflicts in the Sudan,
Angola, the Congo, Sierra Leone, and along the Ethiopia-Eritrean border.
75. The United Nations' limited involvement in Rwanda was in part shaped by the
United States, which, as a permanent member of the Security Council, stalled the United
Nations from taking action. Philip Gourevitch, We Wish To Inform You That Tomorrow We
Will Be Killed With Our Families 150-54 (1998); see also Wole Soyinka, Hearts of
Darkness, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1998 (Book Review. Sec.), at 11 (reviewing Gourevitch's
book. "[T]he United Nations cannot claim not to have been informed") (emphasis added).
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan has recently ordered an investigation into the United
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nor the Security Council (where, at the time, Rwanda occupied a temporary
seat) were initially willing to acknowledge that a genocide was in fact
occurring in Rwanda, thereby circumventing the "obligations which arise in
connection with the use of the term."'76
While Somalia helps. explain the failure to intervene in Rwanda,
perhaps a more critical factor that explains differential treatment of Kosovo
and Rwanda is Europe's perceived strategic importance to the world's only
superpower, the United States. In his speech justifying the NATO air strikes
against Serbian forces, President Clinton stressed the need to protect
American interests perceived as linked to European interests," as well as the
importance of intervention to prevent a wider war (a risk which also existed
in Rwanda).78 Acknowledging that shared cultural heritage also played a role
in the decision to intervene in the Balkans, NATO Secretary-General Javier
Solana spoke of NATO's response to Kosovo with reference to the alliance's
founding principles, "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and
civilization of their people."79 In sum, the United States is bound to Europe
by strategic interests, a common heritage, and a shared history of military
and geopolitical concerns.
The United States' alliance with Europe and the decision to
intervene on the basis of this alliance may make sense as a foreign policy
Nation's failure to effectively respond to the genocide in Rwanda.
76. Gourevitch, supra note 75, at 153 (quoting State Department spokeswoman,
Christine Shelley, who, at that point was reluctant to admit that a genocide was occurring,
insisting instead on the Clinton Administration's position that "acts of genocide may have
occurred," but that she was not in a position to say how many acts of genocide it takes to
make a genocide).
77. "If we have learned anything from the century drawing to a close, it is that if
America is going to be prosperous and secure we need a Europe that is prosperous, secure,
undivided and free." President Clinton, In the President's Words: "We Act to Prevent a
Wider War," N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1999, at A15 (reprint of speech given the previous
evening).
78. The fact that two world wars were fought primarily in Europe this century is not
an insignificant factor justifying the international community's concern with the Balkans,
although the spread of conflict from Rwanda to the Congo has engulfed numerous African
nations in war, raising similar concerns of a wider war.
79. The New NATO, The Guardian, Apr. 22, 1999, at 20 (quoting Javiar Solana)
(emphasis added); see also Lynne Duke, In Africa, Frustration and Envy Over the West's
Rapid Response, Wash. Post, May 7, 1999, at A31 (Peter Takirambudde, Director of Human
Rights Watch/Africa Division, notes that "the repetitive lack of reaction to African crisis
compared to the rapid response to Kosovo does often encourage people to think that
probably there's a cultural dimension to this").
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matter if such matters are not determined solely on the basis of human rights.
While I am not arguing here that foreign policy should be based solely on
human rights considerations, I am asserting that the selectivity with which
the United States mobilizes human rights concern is relativistic in light of its
differential response to Kosovo and Rwanda. The principle of universality
is undermined when the invocation of strategic interests and "common
heritage" serve as a gateway for determining when and where the human
rights concern is mobilized as part of a humanitarian response to large-scale
violations of rights. Human beings are entitled to human rights regardless of
the location or culture of the humans whose rights are in question.
Of course, humanitarian responses take many forms beyond military
intervention, and the use of force is a blunt instrument for achieving
humanitarian objectives.80 My comments here should not be read as an
endorsement of U.S. policy to use force to protect human rights atrocities
from occurring everywhere in the world, nor should my remarks be
interpreted as advocating for the United States to play the role of the world's
policeman. On the contrary, selectivity of human rights enforcement occurs
precisely because it is often filtered through strategic and other concerns of
the United States, which uses force unilaterally or with narrow coalitions."'
The tendency of the United States "to go to war with narrow
coalitions-from the US/British airstrikes in Iraq to the NATO-led attacks
on Serbia and Kosovo, which are being pursued without a UN mandate-has
undermined the basis for the kind of collective diplomacy that is urgently
needed to resolve regional conflicts." 2 I agree with William Hartung, who
argues for an internationalist preventive strategy.83
80. Disparities between the Balkans and Africa also exist in the provision of non-
military humanitarian assistance, such as refugee aid. T. Christian Miller & Ann M.
Simmons, Relief Camps for Africans, Kosovars World Apart, L.A. Times, May 21, 1999.
81. Note that there is disagreement among scholars on whether such humanitarian
intervention violates international law. Compare Bruno Simma, NA TO, the UN. and the Use
of Force: Legal Aspects, 1998 Eur. J. Int'l L. (vistited June 14, 1999)
<http://ejil.org/joumal/voll0/Nol/abl.html> (NATO bombing of Kosovo and Serbia
violates international law) to scholars cited in William Glaberson, Conflict in the Balkans:
The Law, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1999, at A8 (referring to legal scholars who say the bombing
does not violate international law); see also Norman Kempster, Crisis in Yugoslavia;
Leaders and Scholars Clash Over Legality, L.A. Times, Mar. 26, 1999, at A26.
82. William D. Hartung, Preventive Diplomacy, The Nation, May 10, 1999, at 12
("Not only is bombing the wrong tactic for achieving humanitarian ends but NATO is the
wrong institution for the task at hand." Id. at 11.).
83. Id. at 12.
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Looking ahead beyond Kosovo and Rwanda, this preventive
approach requires investment in multilateral agencies that could diffuse
ethnic conflicts before they escalate into war through resort to a range of
tools that could be employed prior to resort to force." Moreover, the United
States must be willing to give diplomacy a chance by doing the kind of
diplomatic spadework that is required to bring countries like Russia along,
rather than treating them as second-rate powers, which motivates them "to
act against US interests to assert [their] independence on the world stage and
to assuage nationalist resentments at home.""5 If use of force becomes
necessary to stop genocidal attacks on defenseless communities, it should be
deployed lawfully, in consultation with the United Nations and relevant
regional bodies." Furthermore, a preventative strategy will be assisted both
by efforts to stop the spread of deadly weaponry (such as arms sales to
dictators, landmines, and nuclear weapons) and by the establishment of the
International Criminal Court, whose authority to prosecute those accused of
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes should provide a
deterrent effect."7 Finally, the best option for coping with ethnic conflict and
civil strife is to develop a standing U.N. peacekeeping force and "clearer
ground rules for delegating peacekeeping and conflict prevention to broad-
based regional organizations like the Organization of African Unity and the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), a fifty-five
member body that includes Russia.""8
Collectively, these initiatives would provide "tools for dealing with
future conflicts like those in Rwanda and Kosovo besides sitting on our
hands in the face of ethnic slaughter or dropping bombs on the parties to a
civil war."8 9 Having the United States in the role of the world's policeman
will inevitably result in selective responses to human rights crises. Therefore,
a reformed United Nations and other more inclusive regional institutions are
84. Id. Such an investment would be a fraction of the costs of going to war. ("[Tihe
United States could pay its outstanding UN dues for the price of just one B-2 bomber" Id.).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 12. As for the concern that the United Nations does not act rapidly enough
or lacks the political will to act forcefully in a crisis, one proposal is to give the U.N.
Secretary General authority to deploy a limited number of peacekeeping units immediately,
with the requirement that the Security Council would have to vote on the continuation of the
operation within a short period of time following the initial deployment. See id.
89. Id. at 15.
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more appropriate sites for the determination of international humanitarian
responses.
V. HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS:
THE UNITED STATES AS WORLD LEADER?
This Introduction began by challenging the commonly held
assumption that human rights is an exclusively Western idea and that
objections to it are predominantly nonWestem and therefore "cultural." The
United States provides an example of a Western state that has both rejected
the universal application of human rights in its foreign policy decisions
regarding humanitarian intervention, and has failed to apply the principle of
universality at home. While the United States has ratified the ICCPR and
other conventions (on genocide, torture, and racial discrimination), it has yet
to ratify two major treaties-the International Covenant on Economic,
Cultural, and Social Rights (ICECSR) and CEDAW (although President
Carter signed both treaties and submitted them to Congress). Even those
treaties that have been ratified (and are therefore constitutionally recognized
as the supreme law of the land) are far from being fully realized in the
United States. Racial inequality, police misconduct, poor prison conditions,
and restrictions on immigrants' rights continue to stain the national record.
Economic rights have collapsed and poverty continues to be a chronic
problem, particularly for women, children, and racial and ethnic minorities.
Retrenchment of rights extends to the U.S. Supreme Court's refusal
to apply human rights-even transnational rights found in binding
treaties-both extraterritorially and domestically to non citizens. The
Supreme Court has said that the Fourth Amendment's unreasonable search
and seizure provision does not apply to a search by U.S. federal drug agents
in the home of a Mexican national in Mexico.' The Court has also refused
to apply Article 33 of the Refugee Convention to restrain U.S. Coast Guard
cutters from involuntarily repatriating Haitian refugees without screening
their asylum claims.9' More recently, the Court has failed to stay the
execution of a Paraguayan inmate who was on death row in the United States
90. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990); see also United States
v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (finding no violation of the Extradition Treaty
between the United States and Mexico, the Supreme Court held that a federal district court
had jurisdiction to try a Mexican national who had been forcibly kidnapped and brought to
the United States).
91. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
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and who was denied access to a consular official as required by the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations.92 These cases (and the precedent they
establish internationally through state practice) impair human rights
enforcement globally.
93
This lack of leadership on the human rights front is not limited to the
Supreme Court. The Executive Branch has been a leading opponent of an
independent International Criminal Court. The White House has also
opposed efforts to strengthen protections that prevent the participation of
children in armed conflict, despite the devastating impact war has on
children.' Moreover, Washington has not supported the Oslo accord
banning the production, use and export of antipersonnel landmines. The
legislative branch has also taken a restrictive approach to human rights,
refusing, for example, to consent to ratification of CEDAW or the ICESCR
or to enact implementing legislation for treaties that may be nonself-
executing.
The universality of human rights is threatened by a superpower that
treats human rights as a paradigm that applies "over there" but not "here."
Human rights is indeed the idea of our time. For this idea to endure well into
the next century and beyond, all governments must respect, protect, and
ensure human rights everywhere.
92. Breard v. Greene, 118 S.Ct. 1352 (1998). But see Breard, 118 S.Ct. at 1357
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing amicus brief submitted by the United States, which
acknowledges that the Vienna Convention had been violated, Justice Breyer held open the
possibility that this argument had merit and stated that he would have stayed the execution
and considered the petition for certiorari accordingly). The Vienna Convention requires that
a person arrested in a foreign country be quickly notified of his right to communicate with
his home country's consular officials. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 42,
Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
93. Indeed, Madeline Albright expressed concern that Breard's execution would have
negative implications for U.S. citizens arrested overseas. By contrast, the Justice
Department's position was that there should be no interference in Virginia's executing Mr.
Breard, despite any violation of the Vienna Convention. David Stout, Clemency Denied,
Paraguayan Is Executed, N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1998, at A 18.
94. The Clinton Administration's opposition is primarily based on the Pentagon's
objections to raising the age of military recruitment to eighteen years old. Telephone
Interview with Jo Becker, Human Rights Watch (June 22, 1999).
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